Philosophy Talk: "Hypothetical Consent and Social Contract Theory"

Prof. Chetan Cetty  

Department of Philosophy

 

"Hypothetical Consent and Social Contract Theory"

 

Social contract theory is often understood to ground political authority in hypothetical consent. The most serious objection to the theory (what I call the Emptiness Objection) contends that hypothetical consent is normatively vacuous since it (a) cannot substitute for actual consent and (b) does not play any real justificatory role. Many have tried to defend the use of hypothetical consent in social contract theory, but their attempts don’t clearly evade the objection. In this talk, I explore what can be salvaged from the theory if we concede the objection. I propose two reformulations of social contract theory, an Internalist and an Externalist version, showing how they each capture most, if not all, of the theory's major commitments while avoiding the objection. After evaluating the merits and demerits of each, I make a preliminary case for the Externalist reformulation. Ultimately, I argue that both approaches require more serious examination given the continuing difficulty social contract theory faces in overcoming the Emptiness Objection.